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ABSTRACT 
Two studies examined the processing of responses directed toward 
the self versus others by dysphoric, clinically depressed, and 
remitted depressed sul;jects. Study 1showed that dysphoric su!J- 
jects found positive and negative responses toward the self 
equally informative. Nondysphoric sul;jects found positive re- 
sponses toward the self more informative than negative re- 
sponses. When responses were directed toward others, dysphoric 
sul;jectsfound positive responses more informative thannegative 
responses. In contrast, nondysphoric sul;jectsfound positive and 
negative responses directed toward others equally informative. 
Study 2 replicated these results with clinically depressed versus 
nondysphoric sul;jects. Study 2 also showed that remitted de- 
pressed sul;jectsfound positive responses more informative than 
negative responses, regardless of whether they were directed 
toward theself or toward others. Results suggest thatpositive and 
negative constructs an differentially acr.essWlefur dysphoric, clinir 
cally depressed, nmitted depressed, and nondysphoric sul;jects 
when processing information directed toward the self versus 
others. 
 
Research has consistently revealed that, in contrast 
with nondysphoric individuals, dysphoric subjects 
identify more negative attributes as . self-descriptive 
(e.g., Gotlib & Olson, 1983;Kuiper, 1982; Pietromonaco & 
Markus, 1985;Tabachnik, Crocker, &Alloy, 1983), recall 
more negative events from the past (DeMonbreun & 
Craighead, 1977; Dobson & Shaw, 1981;Lishman, 1972; 
 Lloyd & Lishman, 1975), and provide more pessimistic 
predictions about the future (Garber & Hollon, 1980; 
Hammen & Krantz, 1976). According to Beck (1967, 
1976), depressive information processing stemsfrom the 
activation of pathological cognitive structures or sche- 
mas. Depressive schemas develop earlyin life inresponse 
to acutely stressful experiences such as the perception of 
parental rejection or emotional deprivation. Once estab- 
lished, negative schemas about the self, the world, and 
the future may become activated during adulthood in 
response to similarly stressful experiences. The activa- 
tion of negative schemas is believed to produce various 
 
 
 
 
cognitive errors (e.g., arbitrary inference, selective ab- 
straction, magnification and minimization) and to result 
in a systematic negative bias in self-referent information 
processing. 
A fundamental assumption of Beck's (1967, 1976) 
theory is that the activation of depressive schemas 
interferes with the processing of positive information 
related to the self. This assumption has also been 
adopted by several contemporary theorists who have 
extended, elaborated, and modified Beck's  theory  on 
the role of the self in depression. For example, Kuiper 
and his colleagues (Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper & 
MacDonald, 1982) suggested that negative content in 
the self-representations of dysphoric individuals facili- 
tates more efficient processing of negative rather than 
positive self-referent information. More recent models 
have argued that dysphoric and nondysphoric individu- 
als do not differ in the extent to which positive and 
negative self-constructs are available in memory (i.e., 
construct availability) but, rather, differ in the readiness 
with which these self-constructs are invoked during in- 
formation processing (i.e., construct accessibility; Bargh & 
Tota, 1988; Gotlib & McCann, 1984). 
The common theme across these models is that self- 
reference is an important determinant of depressive and 
nondepressive information processing. In one of the 
earliest studies to test this hypothesis, Hoehn-Hyde, 
Schlottman, and Rush (1982) asked depressed psychiat- 
ric patients, remitted depressed patients, and nonde- 
pressed controls to rate the amount of positive, negative, 
and neutral content in videotaped scenes depicting com- 
mon social interactions. Depressed subjects consistently 
rated social interactions less positively when they imag- 
ined that the interactions were directed  toward them- 
selves versus others. In contrast, nondepressed subjects 
rated the interactions more positively when they imag- 
ined the interactions were directed toward themselves 
versus others. In a more recent study, Bargh and Tota 
(1988) found that negative constructs were more ac- 
cessible for dysphoric than for nondysphoric subjects 
only during the processing of self-referential informa- 
tion. Such findings are consistent with the results of 
other studies in suggesting that processing biases in 
depression are restricted to self-referent information 
and involve inhibited processing of positive informa- 
tion and/or facilitated processing of negative informa- 
tion (Greenberg & Alloy, 1989; Martin, Abramson, & 
Alloy, 1984; Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987; Sweeney, Shaeffer, & Colin, 1982). In 
contrast, nondysphoric subjects have been characterized 
as possessing a positive cognitive set or orientation to the 
self that inhibits the processing of negative information 
related to the self (see Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Not all studies, however, have found that depressive 
information processing is restricted to the self. For ex- 
ample, Alloy and Ahrens (1987) asked dysphoric and 
nondysphoric subjects to estimate the likelihood that 
positive events (making the dean's list) versus negative 
events (being put on academic probation) would occur 
in the future for themselves versus others. Compared to 
nondysphoric subjects, dysphoric subjects were more 
pessimistic in their forecasts for both themselves and 
others. Tabachnik et al. ( 1983) also found that dysphoric 
subjects' evaluations of themselves and others were 
equally negative. Evidence of a pervasive processing bias 
for self and others is  difficult to reconcile with the 
cognitive model of depression and recent developmen- 
talmodels that emphasize the emergence of avulnerable 
self as a precondition to dysphoria and depression 
(Higgins, 1989; Moretti & Higgins, 1990). 
There are several factors that contribute to the dispar- 
ity in research findings. To date, studies have used a 
variety of samples ranging from subjects exposed to 
negative mood induction (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 1984, 
Study 2) to dysphoric college students (e.g., Bargh & 
Tota, 1988; Tabachnik et al., 1983) and clinically de- 
pressed psychiatric patients (e.g., Derry & Kuiper, 1981; 
Hoehn-Hyde et al., 1982). Although these approaches 
have been valuable in assessing the degree to which 
processing biases may occur in different populations and 
whether these biases can be induced experimentally, it 
is likely that these samples differ in important ways other 
than depression that influence their performance on 
processing tasks. The responses of subjects who have 
been exposed to negative mood induction are unlikely 
to be influenced by the same intensity of negative mood 
and history of negative life experiences as are the re- 
sponses of clinically depressed individuals. Dysphoric 
subjects may experience a broad range of subclinical 
symptoms beyond the diagnostic category of depression 
and, therefore, differ considerably from clinically de- 
pressed subjects Qoiner, Schmidt, & Metalsky, 1994; 
Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram, 1987). 
Studies have not included multiple samples to allow for 
direct comparison of performance on the same mea- 
sures. The present research included nondysphoric, 
dysphoric, clinically depressed, and remitted depressed 
individuals to assess how similar and different processing 
biases are in these different samples. 
Equivocal research findings may also reflect the fact 
that previous studies have varied in the types of process- 
ing conditions that they have examined. Some studies 
have compared dysphoric versus nondysphoric sub- 
jects under self-referential processing conditions (e.g., 
Dobson & Shaw, 1987), whereas others have focused on 
processing biases associated with self-reference versus 
 
 
  
other-reference. To delineate the specific conditions 
under which processing biases take place, it is necessary 
to include conditions in which dysphoria and depression 
should influence processing, as well as conditions in 
which it should not influence processing. In this regard, 
it is interesting to note that there is a growing movement 
toward understanding depression within an interper- 
sonal context (Blatt & Zuroff, 1992; Coyne, l976b; 
McCann, 1990; Safran, 1990). From this theoretical per- 
spective, dysphoria and depression are expected to influ- 
ence the processing of all interpersonal information, 
including interpersonal information directed toward 
self and others. Therefore, in research examining pro- 
cessing biases, it may be important to include conditions 
that are interpersonally relevant, as well as conditions 
that are not interpersonally relevant, to determine 
whether processing biases are circumscribed or perva- 
sive. In the current study, we evaluated biases in 
the processing of the same information in self-
referent, other-referent, and control conditions to 
determine the conditions under which dysphoria and 
depression influence information processing. 
Finally, discrepancy in previous research findings may 
reflect the wide range of tasks used to assess processing 
biases. Research has typically assessed response latencies 
and recall patterns for positive and negative personality 
adjectives (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988; Gotlib & McCann, 
1984; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Kuiper & MacDonald, 
1982). Although this research has produced interesting 
findings, these stimuli do not tap the broader self-other 
interpersonal context in which depression often takes 
place (Segal, 1988). In the current research, we intro- 
duced a new methodology for examining biases in the 
processing of interpersonally relevant information. Spe- 
cifically, we examined the degree to which dysphoric and 
nondysphoric subjects perceived positive versus negative 
expressions as  interpersonally informative and the speed 
with which they identified these expressions under three 
conditions: (a) when responses were directed toward the 
self, (b) when responses were directed toward a general- 
ized other, and (c) when responses were directed neither 
toward the self nor toward others. In each condition, 
subjects were tachistoscopically presented with a series 
of stimuli consisting of two pictures of the same target. 
In one picture, the target displayed a neutral expression; 
in the other picture, the target displayed a positive or 
negative expression. Stimuli were presented for 300 ms. 
Subjects were instructed to identify the picture of the 
target that was most informative about how the target felt 
about the subject (self-referent condition) or about an- 
other person (other-referent condition). In the control 
condition, subjects identified the picture of the target 
that displayed the highest degree of emotion. Subjects 
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible, and 
response latencies and target selection were recorded. 
Response latencies provided an indication of the ease 
with which subjects made decisions and, presumably, the 
accessibility of constructs during processing (Higgins & 
King, 1981). Target selection provided an indication of 
the direction of bias during information processing. 
Cognitive models commonly suggest that processing 
biases are more likely to influence responses when ob- 
jective information about a stimulus is limited, ambigu- 
ous, or both (Higgins & King, 1981; Neisser, 1967). For 
this reason, brief exposure periods were used in this 
experiment. This procedure limited extended observa- 
tion of stimulus characteristics that may have overridden 
processing biases. The pairing of targets- displaying a 
neutral response with targets displaying a positive or 
negative response was also used to increase the likeli- 
hood of detecting subtle processing biases. When non- 
dysphoric subjects are presented with positive versus 
negative responses toward the self and then asked to 
indicate which response is more informative, a powerful 
processing bias may be required to consistently override 
the compelling stimulus characteristics of negative re- 
sponses in preference of positive responses. When the 
alternative stimulus is neutral, however, biases toward or 
against particular categories of emotional responses may 
be more likely to be detected. If nondysphoric subjects 
consistently identified neutral responses as more infor- 
mative than negative responses when this contradicts the 
objective level of information provided by the two re- 
sponses, this would reveal a bias against the identifica- 
tion of negative self-referent information. 
 
STUDY l 
 
In the first study, we predicted that dysphoric subjects 
in the self-referent condition would perceive positive 
responses as equally informative, or perhaps even as less 
informative, than negative responses in revealing how 
others felt about them. Corresponding predictions were 
made regarding the speed of processing; dysphoric sub- 
jects were expected to identify positive responses to the 
self no more quickly, or perhaps even more slowly, than 
negative responses. In contrast, we predicted that non- 
dysphoric subjects would perceive the positive responses 
of others as more informative than negative responses in 
revealing how others felt about them. Nondysphoric 
subjects were expected to identify positive responses to the 
self significantly more quickly than negative responses. 
Dysphoric and nondysphoric subjects were also ex- 
pected to differ in how they processed positive and 
negative information directed toward others. Taylor and 
Brown (1988) concluded that nondysphoric individuals 
view the world in an overly positive manner only with 
respect to themselves, whereas this may not be true for 
  
dysphoric subjects. We predicted that dysphoric subjects 
would perceive positive responses that were directed 
toward others as more informative than negative re- 
sponses, and that they would identify positive responses 
to others significantly more quickly than negative re- 
sponses. In contrast, nondysphoric subjects were ex- 
pected to perceive positive and negative responses 
directed toward others as equally informative and to 
identify positive and negative responses to others with 
equal speed. Finally, we expected that the perceived 
informativeness and processing speed of dysphoric and 
nondysphoric subjects would not differ when they pro- 
cessed information that was directed neither toward the 
self nor toward others. 
Method 
SUBJECTS 
Participating in the study were 30 dysphoric (15 
males, 15 females) and 30 nondysphoric (15 males, 15 
females) undergraduates. Subjects with scores of 0 to 8 
on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) were classified as 
nondysphoric, and subjects with scores of 9 or greater 
were classified as dysphoric. This threshold was originally 
established to indicate mild depression (Beck, Steer, & 
Garbin, 1988), although this level of depressive affect is 
more appropriately captured by the label dysphoria 
(Kendall et al., 1987). Mean BDI scores were 12.74 (SD = 
3.25) for the dysphoric group and 2.83 (SD = 2.03) for 
the nondysphoric group. Analysis of possible sex differ- 
ences in level of dysphoria indicated that males and 
females  were similar in their reports of symptoms in 
both groups, F(l, 59) = 0.98, p> .05. Males and females 
in the dysphoric group reported comparable levels of 
symptoms (Ms= 11.87and 13.67, respectively). Males and 
females in the nondysphoric group also reported 
comparable levels of symptoms (Ms = 2.67 and 3.00, 
respectively). 
EXPERIMENI'AL  TASK 
Subjects were simultaneously presented with two pic- 
tures of the same target. In one picture, the target 
displayed a neutral expression; in the other picture, the 
target displayed either a positive or a negative expres- 
sion. Stimuli were selected from Ekman's (1976) series 
of pictures of facial emotions. This series of 110 black- 
and-white pictures consists of photographs of 14 posers, 
each displaying six emotional expressions as well as a 
neutral expression. Ekman reported that subjects correctly 
identify emotional expressions with 70o/o-100% accuracy. 
In the current study, pictures of targets with happy 
open-mouth expressions, sad open-mouth expressions, 
and neutral expressions were selected to create two-pic- 
ture stimulus arrays. Each picture was positioned on one 
half of a stimulus card, approximately two degrees from 
the center. Side of presentation of the emotional face 
was determined randomly. Seven practice trial cards and 
two sets of 13stimulus cards were created in this manner. 
Presentation of the stimulus cards within each set fol- 
lowed a fixed-random order. 
Stimulus cards were presented to subjects via a two- 
field tachistoscope. Before each trial, subjects were asked 
to fixate on a central point in their visual field that was 
marked by the illumination of a centrally positioned 
single red light for a period of 750 ms. Termination of 
the fixation light triggered the presentation of the stimu- 
lus card for a period of 300 ms and the onset of a 
reaction time clock. This was immediately followed 
by the re- presentation of a white visual field. 
Depressing one of two response keys stopped the 
reaction time clock. Pilot testing was completed to 
establish an exposure duration that would ensure a 
moderate overall level of accuracy of identification. 
With an exposure duration of 300 ms, the overall level 
of accuracy of identification was 72.5%. 
TARG£T IDENTIFICATION TASK 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three ex- 
perimental conditions. In the self-referent condition, 
subjects were asked to make forced-choice judgments 
about the pictures from a self-referent perspective. Self- 
reference was induced by providing subjects with the 
following instructions: 
In viewing these photographs, please try to imagine as 
vividly as possible that you are involved in a social inter- 
action with the person in the photograph. Try to imag- 
ine that these pictures reflect emotional responses to 
your behavior-to something you have said or done-in 
a social interaction with this person . . . . [YJour task is to 
identify the face reflecting the strongest emotional re- 
sponse to you-that is, the fuce that tells you the most 
about how this person feels about you. 
Subjects pressed one of the two response keys to indicate 
whether they believed the photograph on the right or 
the photograph on the left was the most informative. 
In the other-referent condition, subjects received in- 
structions designed to induce other-reference. They 
were instructed to view the pictures as if they were 
emotional responses to a third party. They were also told 
that their task was to take the role of an objective ob- 
server or social scientist and to identify the face reflect- 
ing the strongest emotional response to a third 
party-that is, "the face that tells you the most about how 
this person feels about someone else." Subjects assigned 
to the control condition were simply asked to identify the 
picture displaying the highest degree of emotion. 
DEPENDENI' MEASURES 
 
The first dependent measure was perceived interper- 
sonal  informativeness--that is, the number of times that 
 
 
 
 
 
a positive or a negative response was identified as con- 
veying the most information about how the target felt 
about the subject (self-referent condition) or someone 
else (other-referent condition), or the number of times 
that the response was identified as conveying the highest 
degree of emotion (control condition) . The second de- 
pendent measure was response latency-that is, the 
amount of time required by subjects to identify the target 
requested in the instructions that they received. 
MANIPULATION CHECK 
 
On a 7-point scale (ranging from I = Extremely unsuc- 
cessful to 7 = Extremely successful), subjects in the self- 
referent condition and the other-referent condition 
rated how successful they were in adopting a self-referent 
or other-referent perspective. They also evaluated on a 
7-point scale (ranging from 1 = Extremely difficult to 7 = 
Extremely easy) how difficult they found the task. 
PROCEDURE 
 
Subjects completed the experiment individually. 
Upon arrival, subjects were told that the experiment 
investigated the perception of facial emotion, and then 
they were randomly assigned to one of the three experi- 
mental conditions. After completing the BDI, subjects 
were seated in front of the tachistoscope and provided 
with appropriate experimental instructions. Two nonta- 
chistoscopically presented trials were completed to en- 
sure that subjects fully understood the instructions. This 
was followed by the tachistoscopic presentation of 7 
practice trials and two sets of 13experimental trials. The 
two sets of experimental trials were separated by a brief 
3-min rest period, during which time the instructions 
were repeated. After completing the task, subjects in the 
self- and other-referent conditions completed the ma- 
nipulation check. Subjects were then fully debriefed. 
Results 
Two 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVAs with two between-subject 
factors (dysphoria: dysphoric, nondysphoric; condition: 
self-referent, other-referent, control) and one-within 
subject factor (target affect: positive, negative) were 
completed with perceived informativeness and log-trans- 
formed reaction time as dependent variables. Logarith- 
mic transformation was performed on reaction-time 
scores because of dependency between the mean and 
standard deviation. 
With respect to perceived informativeness, this analy- 
sis produced significant main effects for condition, F(2, 
54) = 9.93, p < .0002, and target affect, F(l , 54) = 28.44, 
p < .0001. These effects indicated that subjects perceived 
both positive and negative expressions as less informative 
in the self-referent (M= .64) than in the other-referent 
(M = .80) or the control (M = .84) conditions, and that 
subjects perceived positive expressions as more informa- 
tive (M = .84) than negative expressions (M = .68). No 
other lower order effects reached significance. As pre- 
dicted, a significant  Dysphoria x Condition x Target 
Affect interaction effect emerged for perceived informa- 
tiveness, F(2, 54) = 5.60, p < .006. 
With respect to reaction time, significant main effects 
were found for depression, F(l , 54) = 7.95, p < .007, 
condition,F(2, 54) = 4.44,p< .02, and target affect,F(l, 54) 
= 46.50, p < .0001. These effects indicated that dysphoric 
subjects (M= 1,069 ms) responded more slowly than did 
nondysphoric  subjects  (M =  887 ms);  that  all subjects 
responded more slowly in the self-referent (M = 1,146 
ms) than in the other-referent (M= 919 ms) or control 
(M= 868 ms) conditions; and that all subjects responded 
more slowly when identifying negative (M = 1,067 ms) 
than positive (M= 889 ms) expressions. No other lower 
order effects reached significance. As predicted, asignifi- 
cant Dysphoria x Condition X Target Affect interaction 
effect emerged for reaction time, F(2, 54) = 5.34, p< .008. 
Analyses of nontransformed reaction-time scores pro- 
duced comparable results. 
Each hypothesis was tested by computing specific 
two-way Dysphoria x Target Affect simple effect ANOVAs 
within each condition for each dependent variable. When 
these interaction effects proved significant, planned com- 
parisons were completed. 
SEU-REFERENT INFORMATION PROCESSING 
 
As predicted, the hypothesis that dysphoric and non- 
dysphoric subjects would process self-referent positive 
and negative information differently was confirmed by 
the significant Dysphoria x Target Affect interaction 
effect within the self-referent condition on the perceived 
informativeness, F(l , 18) = 5.26, p = .03, and response 
latency, F( l , 18) = 6.65, p = .02, dependent variables. As 
Tables 1 and 2 show, dysphoric subjects perceived posi- 
tive and negative responses as nearly equally informative 
when directed toward the self (Ms = .63 and .58, respec- 
tively), t(l8) = 0.50, p > .05, and they identified positive 
and negative expressions in this condition with compa- 
rable speed (Ms = 1,342 ms and 1,283 ms, respectively), 
t(l8)  = 0.39, p > .05. In contrast, nondysphoric  subjects 
in the self-referent condition perceived positive expres- 
sions as more informative than negative expressions (Ms = 
.85 and .48, respectively), t(l8) = 3.71, p < .01, and they 
identified positive expressions significantly more quickly 
than negative expressions in this condition (Ms = 791 ms 
and 1,169 ms, respectively),  t(l8) = 3.95, p< .01. 
OTHER-REFERENI'  INFORMATION  PROCESSING 
 
We also predicted that dysphoric and nondysphoric 
subjects would differ in how they processed positive and 
negative responses directed toward others. This predic- 
tion was supported by a significant Dysphoria X Target 
Affect interaction effect within the other-referent condi- 

 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Perceived Informativeness of Expressions for Dysphoric 
and Nondysphoric Subjects in the Self-Referent, Other- 
Referent, and Control Conditions, Study 1 
 
 
Target Affect 
 
Condition and Group Positive Negative 
Self-referent 
Dysphoric 
 
.63 
 
.58 
Nondysphoric .85a .4Sb 
Other-referent 
Dysphoric .87a .65b 
Nondysphoric .86 .83 
Control 
Dysphoric .9la .75b 
Nondysphoric .94a .75b 
 
 
NOTE: Above numbers indicate mean percentages of positive and 
negative expressions identified as more informative than neutral re- 
sponses (e.g., in the self-referent condition, nondysphoric subjects 
identified85% of positive expressions as more informative than 
neutral expressions but only 48% of negative expressions as more 
informative than neutral expressions). Means within rows with 
different subscripts differ significantly at .05 or less. All comparisons 
are  within group and condition. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Response Latencies (in ms) for the Identification of Ex- 
pressions by Dysphoric and Nondysphoric Subjects inthe 
Self-Referent, Other-Referent, and Control Conditions, 
Study 1 
 
 
Target Affect 
 
 
Qmdition and Group Positive Negative 
 
 
 
Self-referent 
Dysphoric 
 
1,341.77 
 
1,283.19 
Nondysphoric 790.63a 1,169.2b 
Other-referent 
Dysphoric 866.79a 
 
l,105.42b 
Nondysphoric 782.09a 921.3lb 
Control 
Dysphoric 854.79a 
 
965.00b 
Nondysphoric 699.73a 956.28b 
NOTE: Means within rows with different subscripts differ significantly 
at .05 or less. All comparisons are within group and condition. 
 
ti.on for perceived informativeness,  F(l, 18) = 4.46, p < 
.05, and a marginally significant interaction for response 
latency, F(l, 18) = 3.17,p= .09.As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, 
dysphoric subjects perceived positive expressions as sig- 
nificantly more informative than negative responses 
when they  were directed toward others (.M's = .87 and 
.65, respectively), t(l8) = 3.43, p < .01, and they 
identified positive expressions more quickly than 
negative expres- 
sions in this condition (Ms = 867 ms and 1,105 ms, 
respectively}, t(l8) = 4.97, p < .001. In contrast, non- 
dysphoric subjects perceived positive and negative re- 
sponses as equally informative when they were directed 
toward others (.M's = .86 and .83, respectively), t(l8) = 
0.44, p > .05. Nonetheless, nondysphoric subjects iden- 
tified positive  expressions more quickly than negative 
expressions when they were directed toward others 
(.M's = 782 ms and 921 ms, respectively), t(l8) = 2.41, 
p<. 05. 
PROCESSING INFORMATION 
IN THE CONI'ROL CONDITION 
We did not expect dysphoric and nondysphoric sub- 
jects to differ in their processing of positive and negative 
responses in the control condition. The Dysphoria x 
TargetMfect interaction effect within the control condi- 
tion was not significant for either dependent variable- 
perceived informativeness: F(l,  18)  =  0.15, p > .05; 
response latency: F(l, 18) = 2.54, p > .05. As Tables 1and 
2 show, both dysphoric and nondysphoric subjects in the 
control condition perceived positive expressions asmore 
informative than negative expressions (dysphoric sub- 
jects: Ms = .91 and .75, respectively; nondysphoric sub- 
jects: Ms = .94 and .75, respectively), and they identified 
positive expressions more quickly than negative expres- 
sions in this condition (dysphoric subjects: Ms = 855 ms 
and 965 ms, respectively; nondysphoric subjects: Ms = 
700 ms and 956 ms, respectively). 
MANIPULATION CHECK 
 
A two-way ANOVA with dysphoria and condition as 
between-subjects factors did not produce significant 
main or interaction effects between dysphoria, condi- 
tion, and target affect for perceived task difficulty or 
perceived performance. These results indicate that 
dysphoric and nondysphoric subjects did not  differ in 
the extent to which they believed that adopting a self- 
referent perspective was difficult (Ms = 4.9 and 4.3, 
respectively) or in how successful they felt they were in 
adopting this perspective (Ms = 4.8and 4.5,respectively). 
Similarly, dysphoric and nondysphoric subjects  did not 
differ in the extent to which they believed that adopting 
another-referent perspective was difficult (Ms,,;, 5.3and5.7, 
respectively) or in how successful they felt they were in 
adopting this perspective (Ms = 4.7 and 5.3, respectively). 
Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that dysphoric sub- 
jects perceived self-referent positive and negative expres- 
sions as equally informative, and they identified these 
expressions with equal speed. When information was 
directed toward a generalized other, dysphoric subjects 
perceived positive expressions as significantly more in- 
formative than negative expressions, and they identified 
positive expressions significantly more quickly than 
negative expressions. 
  
These results suggest that dysphoria may be 
associated with inhibition in the processing of positive 
information that is directed toward the self. Because of 
this inhibition, dysphoric subjects appear to process 
positive and negative self-referent information with 
equal efficiency. This finding is consistent with 
numerous studies document- ing an evenhanded 
attributional style in dysphoric and clinically 
depressed individuals (Miller, 1976; Miller & Moretti, 
1988;Miller &Ross, 1975).The results also show that 
whereas dysphoric individuals have difficulty pro- 
cessing positive information directed toward the self, 
these difficulties do not arise when they process positive 
information that is directed toward others. The inhibi- 
tion or the reduced accessibility of positive constructs 
occurs only in relation to the self. This finding is 
consistent with previous research and models of con- 
struct accessibility in depression (Higgins & King, 1981; 
Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985; Spielman & Bargh, 1990; 
Sweeney et al., 1982). 
In contrast to dysphoric subjects, we found that non- 
dysphoric subjects perceived self-referent positive ex- 
pressions as significantly more informative than negative 
expressions and that they identified self-referent positive 
expressions significantly more quickly than negative ex- 
pressions. In contrast, when information was directed 
toward a generalized other, nondysphoric subjects 
perceived positive and negative expressions as equally 
informative. 
These results provide further support  for the  view 
that nondysphoric subjects have a positive cognitive 
set or orientation to the self that facilitates efficient 
processing of positive information but inhibits the 
processing of negative self-referent information 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988). These findings are also 
consistent with the wide- spread conclusion that 
nondysphoric individuals show self-serving 
attributional and information processing bi- ases (Miller, 
1976; Miller & Moretti, 1988; Miller & Ross, 1975; Taylor 
& Brown, 1988). 
Finally, as predicted, dysphoric and nondysphoric 
subjects did not differ significantly in their processing of 
positive and negative information that was not directed 
toward the self or toward a generalized other. The fact 
that dysphoric and nondysphoric subjects did not differ 
in the control conditions further supports  the notion 
that results in the self-referent and other-referent condi- 
tions are due to fluctuations in the accessibility of posi- 
tive and negative constructs rather than differences in 
the availability of these constructs in memory. More 
important, the fact that dysphoric subjects demonstrated 
processing biases only in the interpersonally relevant 
conditions (self-referent and other-referent), and not in 
the control condition, further supports the importance 
of understanding dysphoria and depressive cognition 
within an interpersonal  context. 
STUDY2 
 
Our results provide support for models of depression 
that assign a unique role to the self and that emphasize 
the interpersonal context of depression. Itis important 
to note, however, that the use of college populations in 
research on depression has been strongly criticized (e.g., 
Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). The relationship between 
dysphoria and clinical depression is not well 
understood. Beck (1967) suggested that as depression 
worsens, self- schemas become increasingly 
dominated by negative content. Kuiper and his 
colleagues (Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1989) 
showed that the self-schemas of clini- cally depressed 
individuals are more consistently nega- tive in content 
than are the self-schemas of nondysphoric individuals. 
From a construct accessibility perspective, increasing 
levels of depression may further inhibit the processing 
of positive self-referent information and may even 
facilitate the processing of negative self-referent 
information. In contrast to dysphoric subjects, clinically 
depressed subjects may show a pronounced bias toward 
more efficient processing of negative than positive self- 
referent information. This possibility was examined in 
Study 2, using a sample of clinically depressed subjects. 
The increasing severity of negative mood in clinical 
depression may also increase the pervasiveness of infor- 
mation processing biases. Beck (1967) suggested that 
this occurs because information processing becomes 
more completely dominated by intrusive negative sche- 
mas: "As these idiosyncratic schemas become more ac- 
tive, they are evoked by a wider range of stimuli which 
are less logically related to them" (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979, p. 13).If negative constructs are frequently 
activated, they are likely to become chronically accessi- 
ble, thereby increasing the probability that they will be 
indiscriminately activated during information process- 
ing (Higgins & Moretti, 1988). Thus, in clinically de- 
pressed individuals, it is possible that processing biases 
extend beyond the self and influence the processing of 
other-referent and interpersonally irrelevant informa- 
tion in a similar manner. This possibility was also exam- 
ined in the second study. 
Finally, in Study 2, we included a remitted depressed 
group of subjects to determine whether the processing 
biases found in Study 1 are stable vulnerability markers 
of depression or transient correlates of the disorder that 
disappear during remission. Research on the persistence 
of cognitive characteristics of depression during periods 
of remission has produced mixed results. Teasdale and 
Dent (1987) found that women who had recovered from 
a depressive episode continued to show poorer recall of 
self-referent positive words and recalled more negative 
self-descriptions when exposed to a negative mood in- 
duction than did nondysphoric subjects. Eaves and Rush 
(1984) also found that remitted depressed subjects con- 
 
 
 
 
 
tinued to show cognitive features exhibited during peri- 
ods of depression. Other studies, however, have failed to 
find such evidence. Dobson and Shaw (1987), for exam- 
ple, did not find a self-referent encoding bias in remitted 
depressed subjects. Blackburn and Smyth (1985) also 
failed to find a difference between recovered depressed 
subjects and nondysphoric subjects in the frequency of 
negative cognitions they expressed while induced into a 
mildly negative mood. Similar failures to find evidence 
of enduring cognitive features of depression have been 
reported by Fennel and Campbell (1984), Hamilton and 
Abramson (1983), Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, and 
Franklin (1981), Silverman, Silverman, and Eardley 
(1984), and Wilkinson and Blackburn  (1981). 
If the processing biases of depression co-occur with 
the disorder and are not present in remitted depressed 
individuals, they may play a distal rather than proximal 
role in depression relapse (Beck, 1991), or they may be 
of limited importance in understanding the etiology and 
recurrent course of the illness (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; 
Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Some investigators have sug- 
gested that it is premature to conclude that depressive 
cognitions are simply correlated features of the disorder 
because of conceptual and methodological limitations 
of the research completed to date (Beck, 1991; Kuiper, 
Olinger,&Martin, 1990; Miller &Moretti, 1988;Teasdale 
& Dent, 1987). Researchers have  been encouraged to 
examine the persistence of cognitive features of depres- 
sion in situations that are most likely to activate relevant 
cognitive structures and processes. The methodology 
employed in the current study may be promising in this 
regard because it involves the processing of interper- 
sonal.information, a domain of functioning that is highly 
relevant to depression relapse (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; 
McCann,  1990). 
Method 
SUBJECTS 
A total of 81 subjects participated in the second study. 
Clinically depressed subjects (n = 27) were recruited 
from both inpatient and outpatient clinical services of 
the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, Toronto, Ontario. 
Patients were individually assessed for depression using 
the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophre- 
nia-Lifetime Version. (SADS-L; Endicott & Spitzer, 
1978). Diagnostic interviews were conducted by a gradu- 
ate student trained in conducting the interview. Inter- 
rater reliability for the diagnosis of depression was 
established on a subset of cases. Results indicated 100% 
agreement on the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disor- 
der (MOD) between the interviewer and one of the 
authors who has been trained on the SADS. The de- 
pressed sample included 13males and 14females (mean 
age = 39.81 years) who met the DSM-m (American Psy- 
chiatric Association, 1980) criteria for MOD and whose 
BDI scores ranged from 11 to 43 (M= 24.07). 
Remitted depressed subjects (n = 27) were selected 
from a longitudinal study of psychological factors pre- 
dicting relapse (Segal, Shaw, & Vella, 1989). All subjects 
were individually assessed using the SADS-L to establish 
that a prior episode of clinical depression had occurred 
within the past year but that subjects had been symptom 
free for the past 3 months. The remitted sample in- 
cluded 10males and 17females (mean age = 41.37years) 
whose BDI scores ranged from 0 to 11 (M = 5.04). The 
number of prior episodes of MDD in the remitted group 
ranged from 1 to 15, and 9 of the 27 subjects relapsed 
into MOD within 6months following the study (see Segal 
et al., 1989). ' 
Nondysphoric subjects were recruited from hospital 
employees at the Clarke Institute. All subjects were indi- 
vidually screened using the SADS-L to establish that they 
did not have a history of past psychiatric illness and did 
not show indications of a psychiatric disturbance at the 
time of the study. The nondysphoric control group in- 
cluded 4 males and 23 females (mean age = 28.70 years) 
whose BDI scores ranged from 0 to 6 (M= 2.00). 
Analysis of possible sex differences in the severity of 
depressive symptoms revealed a significant main effect 
for sex, F(l, 62) = 6.09, p < .02, and a significant sex by 
group interaction, F(2, 62) = 5.62, p < .006. Females in 
the clinically depressed group reported significantly 
higher levels of depressive symptoms than did males (Ms = 
28.87 and 19.50, respectively), F(l, 21) = 7.64, p< .01. In 
the nondepressed group, females did not differ from 
males in the level of depressive symptoms that they 
reported (M= 2.04and 1.50,respectively),F(l, 21) = .77, 
p > .05. Similarly, females in the remitted  group did not 
differ from males in the level of depressive symptoms 
that they reported (M= 5.19 and 5.80, respectively), F(l, 
21)  = .03, p > .05.The Sex x Group x Condition interac- 
tion effect did not reach significance, F(4, 62) = 1.08, p > 
.05, indicating that the pattern of male and female re- 
ports of depressive symptoms for each group did not 
differ among conditions. 
PROCEDURE 
As in Study 1, all subjects completed the experiment 
individually. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
the three experimental conditions upon entering the 
experiment. They completed the diagnostic interview 
and the BDI before completing the experiment, follow- 
ing the procedure outlined for Study 1. 
Results 
Two 3 x 3 x 2 ANOVAs with two between-subject 
factors (depression: clinically depressed, remitted de- 
pressed, nondysphoric; condition: self-referent, other- 
 
  
 
referent, control) and one-within subject factor (target 
affect positive, negative) were completed with perceived 
informativeness and reaction time as dependent variables. 
With respect to perceived informativeness, the 3 x 3 x 2 
ANOVA produced  significant main effects for depres- 
sion, F(2, 72) = 4.35, p < .02, and target affect, F( 1, 72) = 
 
TABLE 3: Perceived Informativeness of Expressions for Clinically 
Depressed, Remitted Depressed, and Nondepressed Sub- 
jects in the Self-Referent, Other-Referent, and Control 
Conditions, Study 2 
 
 
Target Affect 
 
 
Condition and Group Positive Negative 
48.90, p < .0001, indicating that depressed subjects per-    
ceived expressions as less informative than did remitted 
depressed or nondepressed subjects ( Ms = .71, .80, and 
.86, respectively) and that all subjects perceived positive 
expressions as more informative than negative expres- 
sions (Ms = .87 and .71, respectively) . All other lower 
order effects did not reach significance. As predicted, a 
significant Depression X Condition X Target Affect inter- 
action  effect  emerged  for perceived  informativeness, 
F(4, 72) = 2.50, p< .05. 
With respect to reaction time, asignificant main effect 
emerged for depression, F(2, 72) = 7.12, p < .002, indi- 
cating that the response times of depressed subjectswere 
significantly longer than those for nondysphoric subjects 
(Ms = 1,146 ms and 837 ms, respectively), t(72) = 2.57, P< 
.025. Remitted depressed subjects also tended to have 
longer reaction times than nondysphoric subjects (Ms = 
1,030 ms and 837 ms, respectively), t(72) = 1.68, p= .10. 
A significant main effect also emerged for target affect, 
F(2, 72) = 125.74, p < .0001, indicating that all subjects 
identified positive expressions more quickly than nega- 
tive expressions (Ms = 884 ms and 1,121ms). All remain- 
ing lower  order interactions  did not reach  significance. 
Contrary to our prediction, the three-way Depression x 
Condition x Target Affect interaction did not reach 
significance, F( 4, 72) = 0.93, p > .05. It may be that the 
extremely slow reaction times of clinically depressed and 
remitted depressed subjects reduced the sensitivity of 
this dependent variable in detecting processing biases. 
Further analyses were completed for the perceived 
informativeness variable only. Each hypothesis was tested 
by computing depression by target affect simple effect 
ANOVAs within each condition. When these interaction 
effects proved significant, planned comparisons were 
completed. 
SEIF-REFERENT INFORMATION PROCESSING 
 
Results showed that the perceived informativeness of 
positive and negative responses differed for clinically 
depressed, remitted depressed, and nondysphoric con- 
trols in the self-referent condition, as indicated by a 
marginally significant Depression (Clinically Depressed, 
Remitted Depressed, Nondysphoric)  x Target Affect in- 
teraction effect, F( 2, 24) = 2.39, p= .11. As Table 3 shows, 
clinically depressed subjects in the self-referent condi- 
tion perceived positive and negative responses as equally 
informative (Ms = .67 and .67, respectively), t(24) = 0.00, 
p > .05. In contrast, nondysphoric  subjects in the self- 
Se lf-referen t 
 
Clinically depressed .67 .67 
Remitted depressed .90a .6lb 
Nondepressed .91a .76b 
Other-referent 
Clinically depressed .89a .69b 
Remitted depressed .96a .67b 
Non depressed .91 .85 
Control 
Clinically depressed .77a .57b 
Remitted depressed .90a .77b 
Non depressed .94a .78b 
 
 
NOTE: Above numbers indicate mean percentages of positive and 
negative expressions identified as more informative than neutral re- 
sponses (e.g., in the self-referent condition, nondepressed subjects 
identified 91% of positive expressions as more informative than neutral 
expressions but only 76% of negative expressions as more informative 
than neutral expressions). Means within rows with different subscripts 
differ significantly at .05 or less. All comparisons are within group and 
condition. 
 
referent condition perceived positive responses as sig- 
nificantly more informative than negative responses (.M; = 
.91 and  .76, respectively),  t(24)  = 2.11, p < .05. These 
results replicate the findings of Study 1. Remitted 
depressed subjects showed a pattern of performance 
that was similar to that of nondysphoric subjects. They 
perceived positive self-referent responses as more infor- 
mative than negative responses (.Ms = 90 and .61, respec- 
tively), t(24) = 4.05, p < .0005. 
OTHER-REFERENT INFORMATION PROCESSING 
 
A significant depression (clinically depressed, remit- 
ted depressed, nondysphoric)  by target affect interac- 
tion effect also emerged within the other-referent 
condition, F( 2, 24) = 3.98, p = .03. Clinically 
depressed subjects, like dysphoric subjects in Study 1, 
perceived 
positive responses as significantly more informative than 
negative responses when they were directed toward oth- 
ers (Ms = .89 and .69, respectively), t(24) = 2.82, p < .01. 
In contrast, nondysphoric  subjects  perceived  positive 
and negative responses toward others as equally informa- 
tive (Ms = .91 and .85, respectively), t(24) = 0.77, p > .05, 
as did nondysphoric subjects in Study 1. The pattern for 
remitted depressed subjects in the other-referent condi- 
tion was similar to that of clinically depressed subjects. 
Remitted depressives perceived positive responses to- 
ward others as significantly more informative than nega- 
tive responses (Ms = .96 and .67, respectively), t(24) = 
4.10, p< .0001. 
 
 
 
 
 
PRfJCESSING  INFORMATION 
IN THE CONTROL CONDITION 
As predicted, clinically depressed, remitted de- 
pressed, and nondysphoric subjects did not significantly 
differ in how informative they found positive and nega- 
tive expressions in the control condition, F(2, 24) = .52, 
p > .05. As Table 3 shows, all subjects perceived positive 
expressions as more emotionally informative than nega- 
tive expressions in the control condition. These results 
replicate the findings of Study 1. 
MANIPULATION CHECK 
A 3 X 2 ANOVA (depression: clinically· depressed, 
remitted depressed, nondysphoric; condition: self- 
referent, other-referent) revealed that all main and in- 
teraction effects involving depression were not significant. 
These results indicate that the groups did not differ in 
the extent to which they believed that adopting a self-ref- 
erent perspective  was  difficult  (Ms = 3.0, 3.9, and 5.2, 
respectively) or in how successful they felt they were in 
adopting this perspective (Ms = 3.0, 4.0, and 4.1, respec- 
tively). Similarly, clinically depressed, remitted depressed, 
and nondepressed subjects did not differ in the extent 
to which they believed  that adopting an other-referent 
perspective was difficult (Ms = 4.9, 4.6, and 3.9, respec- 
tively) or in how successful they felt they  were in 
adopting this perspective (Ms = 5.0, 4.6, and 4.2, 
respectively). 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 replicate the findings of our first 
study. Clinically depressed subjects, like dysphoric sub- 
jects, perceived positive and negative responses as 
equally informative when directed toward the self, but 
they perceived positive responses as significantly more 
informative than negative responses when directed 
toward others. In contrast, nondysphoric subjects per- 
ceived positive responses as significantly more informa- 
tive than negative responses when directed toward the 
self, but they perceived positive and negative responses 
as equally informative when directed toward others. 
In some ways, remitted depressed subjects resembled 
nondysphoric subjects. Like nondysphoric subjects, re- 
mitted depressed subjects perceived positive responses 
as significantly more informative than negative re- 
sponses when they were directed to the self. However, 
unlike nondysphoric subjects, remitted depressed sub- 
jects also perceived positive responses as more informative 
than nega;tive responses when directed toward others. 
Finally, clinically depressed, remitted depressed, and 
nondysphoric subjects did not differ in how informative 
they found positive and negative expressions when these 
responses were not directed toward the self nor toward 
others. As in Study 1, all subjects in this condition per- 
ceived positive  e x p r e s s i o n s   as more informative  
than negative expressions. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the current research indicate that 
dysphoric and clinically depressed subjects process posi- 
tive and negative interpersonal information in a similar 
manner: Both groups perceive positive and negative 
respoes as equally informative when they are directed 
toward the self, yet they perceive positive responses as 
more informative than negative responses when they are 
directed toward others. In contrast, nondysphoric sub- 
jects perceive positive responses that are directed toward 
the self as more informative than negative responses, yet 
they perceive positive and negative responses as equally 
informative when they are directed toward others. 
Our results are consistent with previous research in 
suggesting that the self within an interpersonal context 
plays a critical role in depressive information processing. 
The findings also support the notion that depressive 
information processing reflects fluctuations in the acces- 
sibility rather than availability of positive and negative 
constructs in memory. It does not appear that depressed 
subjects have a greater or fewer number of positive 
constructs available for information processing as com- 
pared to nondysphoric subjects. Rather, the pattern of 
construct accessibility differs for depressed and non- 
dysphoric subjects in self-referent and other-referent 
processing conditions.  In contrast to nondysphoria, 
both dysphoria and clinical depression is more clearly 
associated with the absence of a tendency to favor posi- 
tive over negative self-referent information rather than 
with the presence of a tendency to favor negative infor- 
mation over positive information. Negative responses 
were never perceived as more informative than positive 
responses, even by clinically depressed subjects. These 
results are consistent with the view that dysphoria and 
depression are negative psychological situations that 
involve the absence of positive attributes or outcomes 
(i.e., loss) rather than the presence of negative attri- 
butes or outcomes (i.e., threat; Beck, 1976; Higgins, 
1987; Moretti & Higgins, 1990). The relative difficulty of 
dysphoric and clinically depressed individuals to readily 
identify positive responses directed toward the self may 
reflect underlying problems within the self-system such 
as the presence of self-discrepancies or low levels of 
self-complexity (Higgins, 1987; Linville, 1985; Moretti, 
Higgins, & Feldman, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1987). In contrast, nondysphoric individuals readily 
identify positive responses directed to the self, perhaps 
reflecting underlying self-representational structures 
that facilitate the processing of this information. 
 
  
 
Our results raise some interesting questions about the 
processing of interpersonal information during periods 
of remission from depression. The remitted depressed 
subjects showed a pervasive tendency to view positive 
responses as more informative than negative responses 
regardless of whether they were directed toward the self 
or toward others. On one hand, this seems to have 
beneficial and protective effects for psychological well- 
being (see Taylor & Brown, 1988). On the other hand, 
clinicians are often concerned that clients are at risk for 
relapse when they make a quick "flight into health" 
accompanied by an overly rosy view of the world. It is 
commonly believed that this type of psychological adjust- 
ment is fragile and may easily break down in the face of 
stress. We know that 33% of our remitted sample re- 
lapsed into major depression within 6 months of the 
study, and it is likely that several more subjects have 
relapsed since then. It seems naive to conclude that an 
overly positive bias is effective in  maintaining 
psychological health. It may be that individuals who 
remit from depression attempt to accentuate positive 
information, to defend against negative information, 
or both. When stress becomes overwhelming and when 
attentional re- sources are not available to maintain 
this perspective, remitted depressed individuals may 
decompensate. An alternative explanation is that 
because remitted depressive individuals perceive 
positive responses as more in- formative than negative 
responses, regardless of whether they are directed 
toward the self or toward others, this does not allow for 
favorable self-other comparisons. This may reduce 
important opportunities for increasing and/or 
maintaining self-esteem (Swallow & Kuiper, 1988; 
McCann, 1990). Studies that follow individuals through 
periods of depression, remission, and relapse would be 
informative in this regard. 
Despite the fact that the results of these two studies 
are highly similar and provide compelling evidence that 
dysphoria and depression are associated with biases in 
the processing of interpersonally relevant information, 
there are several limitations we wish to highlight. First, it 
is important to note that the methodology we developed 
only estimates how individuals may process interper- 
sonal information in real-life contexts. This task lacks 
many aspects of real-life interpersonal encounters that 
temper how individuals experience and respond to in- 
terpersonal exchanges. Furthermore, we compared the 
processing of information directed toward the self versus 
a generalized other. It is quite likely that different results 
would be found if one compared how individuals process 
information directed toward the self versus familiar 
others (Prentice, 1990). A recent study by Gara and 
Woolfolk (1993) indicated that clinically depressed indi- 
viduals described themselves, their parents, and signifi- 
cant others as possessing fewer positive aspects and more 
negative aspects than did nondysphoric psychiatric con- 
trol subjects. Future studies are needed to develop more 
sensitive measures of interpersonal information process- 
ing and to evaluate why interpersonal closeness influ- 
ences the pervasiveness of processing biases. A related 
issue is that the processing of interpersonal information 
by dysphoric and clinically depressed individuals takes 
place within a social context that contains information 
about repeated interpersonal experiences. It is possible 
that the patterns we have labeled as mases are in fact a 
true reflection of the base rates of positive versus nega- 
tive responses that depressed individuals experience in 
their day-to-day lives. There is considerable research 
indicating that this may be the case {e.g., Coyne, 1976a; 
Hammen &Peters, 1978; Joiner, Alfano, & Metalsky, 
1992). Therefore, it is important that these results be 
under- stood as a description of patterns of processing 
interpersonal information rather than distortions in  
information processing. Further studies are needed to 
delineate the conditions in which individuals' previous 
experiences introduce biases and distortions in their 
processing of new information. 
A second limitation of the study is the fact that sex 
differences were not fully investigated. In the first 
study, equal numbers of male and female subjects 
were included, and they reported comparable levels of 
depression in the dysphoric and nondysphoric groups. 
In the second study, however, females in the 
clinically de- pressed group reported a higher level of 
symptoms than did males in this group. Recent models 
of depression in women have emphasized the 
differential importance of interpersonal relations in 
defining the self for women versus men (Jordan & 
Surrey, 1986). If this is indeed the case, one would 
expect that depressed females may differ from 
depressed males in how they process positive and 
negative interpersonal information. Further studies are 
needed to identify how males and females differ in their 
processing of interpersonal information. 
Finally, we have used the term accessibility to refer to 
the readiness with which constructs are used in the 
processing of information. Our measures of accessibility 
were ratings of perceived informativeness and reaction 
time. Reaction time may be influenced by a number of 
factors, however, such as decisions to respond in one way 
or another. For this reason, researchers have moved 
toward using paradigms that tax attentional demands to 
limit the influence of controlled decisions on reaction 
time (Bargh, 1992). These procedures were not used in 
the current study, and attempts should be made to do so 
in future work. It is  also  important to note that our 
results did not show reaction time to be a sensitive 
measure in Study 2, because clinically depressed and 
remitted depressed individuals were generally quite slow 
in responding.  It may be that  psychomotor slowness  
 
 
 
 
 
masks processing biases associated with clinical 
depression, or a recent history of clinical depression, 
and reaction time is, therefore, not a sensitive measure 
in these cases. 
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